ḥeleḳ 1. Ḳunṭres ha-bayit -- ḥeleḳ 2. Ḥeleḳ ha-ʻaliyah --.

The problem of God's subordination to laws of logic and mathematics in jewish philosophy and theology.

kerekh 1-2. Maʼamarim rishon ṿe-sheni -- kerekh 3-4. Maʼamarim shelishi u-reviʻi -- kerekh 5. Maʼamar ḥamishi u-firḳe mavo.

[1] Lev Yehudah ḥeleḳ 1, u-vo ḥidushim u-veʼurim be-ʻinyanim shonim. Lev Yehudah ḥeleḳ 2, u-vo heʻarot ṿe-heʼarot ḳetsarot. Boʼu ḥeshbon, u-vo heʻarot be-ḥeshbonot u-midot Ḥazal -- [2] Ḳunṭres Boʼu ḥeshbon ḥeleḳ 2.

Dyuḳan inṭeleḳṭuʼali shel manhig ruḥani be-ʻidan mahapkhani. Yehuda leʼon Ashkenazi (Meniṭo) 1922-1996 hogeh, mekhanekh ṿe-ish maʻaśhe.

מנושאי הספר: האדם ויוצרו, האדם והחברה, האדם וחייו.

First Published in 1984. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

ḥeleḳ 1. - Elul, Tishre - Adar -- ḥeleḳ 2. Nisan-Av.

ḥeleḳ 1. - Elul, Tishre - Adar -- ḥeleḳ 2. Nisan-Av.

Avraham Yitzhaq Ha-Cohen Kook (1865-1935) stands as a colossal figure of modern Jewish history and thought. Jurist, mystic, poet, theologian, communal leader, founder of the modern Chief Rabbinate and still the defining thinker of Religious Zionism, he is indispensable for understanding modern Jewish thought, the contemporary State of Israel, and the most fundamental interactions of religion, nationalism, ethics and spirituality. Despite countless studies of him, almost no full-fledged intellectual biography of him exists in any language. This study of the years (...) before his momentous move to Jaffa in 1904, drawing on little-known works, including recently published manuscripts, begins to fill that gap. It traces his life and times in the remarkably intense Rabbinic intellectual milieu of late nineteenth-century Eastern Europe, and his path from a profound, regularly rationalist traditionalism, towards a dynamic theology and spiritual practice weaving together Kabbalah, philosophy, universal ethics, and romantic mysticism. (shrink)

Avraham Yitzhaq Ha-Cohen Kook (1865-1935) stands as a colossal figure of modern Jewish history and thought. Jurist, mystic, poet, theologian, communal leader, founder of the modern Chief Rabbinate and still the defining thinker of Religious Zionism, he is indispensable for understanding modern Jewish thought, the contemporary State of Israel, and the most fundamental interactions of religion, nationalism, ethics and spirituality. Despite countless studies of him, almost no full-fledged intellectual biography of him exists in any language. This study of the years (...) before his momentous move to Jaffa in 1904, drawing on little-known works, including recently published manuscripts, begins to fill that gap. It traces his life and times in the remarkably intense Rabbinic intellectual milieu of late nineteenth-century Eastern Europe, and his path from a profound, regularly rationalist traditionalism, towards a dynamic theology and spiritual practice weaving together Kabbalah, philosophy, universal ethics, and romantic mysticism. (shrink)

Some aspects of the problem of measurement in quantum theory are treated. We stress that the problem is both physical and conceptual, that the physical problem has been solved and the conceptual one is inherent in quantum theory. We also deal with some remarks made by Wigner concerning physics and the explanation of life, and present alternative positions on the mind-matter relationship within a deterministic framework, as we see them.

In a Recent article [9], Alexander Rosenberg attacks the “manipulative” view of causation as being unilluminating and as being beset with difficulties. As a proponent of that view [3], I have felt it necessary to take up cudgels in its defence.Rosenberg's criticisms are directed at Gasking's version of this view [5]. Gasking's recipe for causation is, “one says ‘A causes B’ in cases where one could produce an event of the A sort as a means to producing one of the (...) B sort”. Here it is taken for granted that we have general manipulative techniques for producing events of the A sort and that this is implicitly assumed when one speaks of A as a cause. There is one qualification to this formula for causes which arises from the necessity for individuating processes, namely, that, for A to be the cause of B, it must not always lead to B, but only in special cases. (shrink)

Is the Copenhagen interpretation really a subjective one? What is the special role that observations play in quantum theory? Is there really something peculiar about the projection postulate? Why does the Copenhagenist treat probabilities as properties of individual systems? Is there a measurement problem, and if so, can itin principle be solved within the framework of quantum theory? We offer aconceptual treatment of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics in which these questions are answered and contrast it with another interpretation (...) which we call Popperism. The interpretations differ in their choice of a state description, from which it follows that they will offer a different account of the relation of measurements to states and different ways of describing quantum theory. But the two descriptions are equally consistent and physically completely equivalent. (shrink)

We consider the mind-dependence or independence of the "now," of "becoming," and of "time's arrow," by considering the various senses in which these notions might be mind-dependent or not. These matters cannot be sensibly discussed without taking a stand regarding criteria of "reality." Proceeding from a basically phenomenalist position we conclude that merely to differentiate between appearance and reality is implicitly to assume a directed flow of time. We discuss the relationship between phenomenological and physical time and their possible asymmetries. (...) We find that physical time acquires meaning only through phenomenological time, and that phenomenological time is fundamentally asymmetric. This still leaves room for the question: Is there anything in physical time which reflects the fact that it, to be meaningful, must be applied asymmetrically? The relevance of relativity theory to this question is discussed. (shrink)

We rebut the objections to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics presented by Park [9,10], Margenau [10], and Popper [11]. It seems to us that these authors, having adopted different interpretations of quantum mechanics, have been unable to grasp the perspective of the Copenhagenist. They therefore miss the points which the Copenhagenist is making when he: accords a special status to observations in quantum theory; attributes a state vector to an individual system; places restrictions on the simultaneous measurability of non-commuting (...) observables; hesitates to use his measurements for retrodictions. In our opinion, the arguments of the above authors reflect their incomprehension of Copenhagenism. Elsewhere [5,6] we have discussed two alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics which we have called Copenhagenism and Popperism. We have there shown how the dispute between the schools stems from disparate uses of the word ‘state’. We continue the discussion here within the context of the above points and show how these disparate notions of state are related to diverse notions of ‘behaviour’. (shrink)

Ḥeleḳ rishon. Maʼamre musar, daʻat ṿe-yirʼat H. lefi seder parashiyot ha-Torah -- ḥeleḳ sheni. ʻIyunim be-musar ṿe-yirʼat H., pirḳe maḥshavot, maʼamre musar, maʻarakhot ha-teshuvah, shevive or.

ha-Derekh la-ʻaliyah -- Bi-shevile ha-ʻavodah -- Dorshe H.